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Relatable Alienation: The Logic
and History of an Idea
Marina Vishmidt
What do I mean by ‘relatable alienation’? First we need to ap‐
preciate the ambiguity of the term ‘alienation’. It’s one of 
those terms that is overpoweringly tempting to use in the 
formulation of generalities, simply because it contains so 
many connotations and usages, both vernacular and spe‐
cialised. To try and map some of these would be an under‐
taking that this essay (a lecture, lightly revised) couldn’t pos‐
sibly provide the scope for, so I’ll have to adopt methods here 
which may seem rather crude, and work more indexically 
than genealogically.
We can say that the significations of ‘alienation’ are influ‐
enced by their relationship to either English- or German-
language etymologies and conventions. In English, the term 
‘alienation’ was historically close to contexts of jurisprudence 
and property law. Such traditional forms are evoked in legal-
sounding but metaphorical expressions like ‘the alienation of 
affection’ (a charge against a third party in a divorce case) or 
‘the right to alienate’, meaning to transfer the title to a prop‐
erty from one owner to another (also known as ‘conveyance’). 
‘Alienation’ in its broader sense thus develops out of technical 
terminology within legal codes that pertains to the circula‐
tion of property. 
So there’s this quite technical use of ‘alienation’, which 
perhaps we don’t encounter that much anymore outside 
these somewhat archaic and arcane legal realms. The other 
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main use of ‘alienation’ in English is to refer to a psychologi‐
cal state that connotes distance or estrangement. To become 
alienated from your friends is to become distanced from 
them due to some kind of irresolvable conflict, like a drink‐
ing problem or a political disagreement, rather than due to a 
contingency, like moving to another country and not having 
Internet. The element of intention is less crucial than the 
scale of the break, with alienation from existing social ties 
being one of the repercussions that signals the severity of the 
initial conflict. Incidentally, the psychological dimension is 
captured well in the little-known English term for ‘psy‐
chotherapist’, used in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, when the profession was emerging: ‘alienist’.
This notion of alienation as a personal experience of so‐
cial estrangement leads us to the German-language deriva‐
tions of alienation, which also register in contemporary 
English uses, namely the more existential dimension of 
alienation, vis-à-vis, say, Albert Camus’s The Stranger and the 
whole set of attitudes associated with 1950s existentialism. 
This is alienation, or unhomeliness, as the constitutive con‐
dition of human existence, something you get in psychoan‐
alytic theory informed by Heidegger and Hegel (itself ‘exis‐
tentialised’ by the teachings of Kojève), such as that elabo ‐
rated by Lacan. For Hegel, alienation is a social ontology of 
separation and negativity, as in the ‘master–slave’ dialectic, 
which was influential for figures like Lacan. Alienation is 
thus a natural human condition borne of inequality and 
conflict. However, it is also the friction that creates the expe‐
rience of distance and rejection of immediate reality, which 
for Hegel is indispensable for reconciliation between the in‐
dividual and their world on a ‘higher level’ of Spirit. This 
casting of alienation as the severing of the self from the self 
is taken up and further developed by Marx, whose work 
serves as the principal source (besides existentialist writings) 
of the inflections that the term alienation has acquired as a 
topic in philosophy and contemporary social and cultural 
83marina vishmidt (2018)
theory. ‘Alienation’ is used to translate terms such as en‐
täusserung, which can mean ‘externalisation’, and entfrem‐
dung, which is more like ‘estrangement’. This conceptual and 
philological ambiguity is also o en encountered in the dis‐
course of theatre, aesthetics and art history when trying to 
disentangle Bertolt Brecht’s verfremdungseffekt or Viktor 
Shklovsky and the Russian Formalists’ ostranenie. These 
terms are both o en translated as ‘de-familiarisation’, but 
really likewise mean ‘estrangement’ (albeit literally rather 
than in the psychologically defined way English speakers 
would tend to read it): to suddenly find the usual world and 
its objects ‘strange’, perhaps through a novel use of language 
or artistic means. 
What we can see already is that there are lots of different 
philosophical projects pursued under the banner of ‘alien‐
ation’, complexified by several etymologies, with the term it‐
self being ‘alienated’ – that is to say, ‘conveyanced’, in the ar‐
chaic English legal sense – across and between them. What 
we can do at this point is to divide these projects, again, very 
crudely, into ‘materialist’ ones and ‘idealist’ ones. For the 
purposes of this demonstration, any use of ‘alienation’ which 
primarily draws on the legal or psychological legacy of the 
term, and which does not explicitly focus on the historical 
and social context of the concept, goes over to the idealist 
side. On the materialist side, pre-eminently, we find Marx 
and his application of alienation to the conditions of labour 
under capitalist social relations, that is, under capitalist prop‐
erty relations. Here, alienation is neither the liberty of the ob‐
ject or the distance experienced by a subject, but the condi‐
tion of persons dispossessed of access to any means of 
survival and thus obliged to look to the market for any 
prospect of the continuation of their existence. This is em‐
bodied, for Marx, by the concept of the worker’s ‘double 
freedom’: the freedom to sell their labour power without any 
of the customary constraints associated with feudalism, and 
the freedom from any means of subsistence if they are un‐
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successful in selling that power. Translated into liberal politi‐
cal theory, with a nod to Isaiah Berlin, this is known as ‘free‐
dom to’ and ‘freedom from’, or, as Berlin called it, ‘negative 
and positive liberty’. 
Of course it’s the privative form of ‘freedom from’ which 
is of most interest to the liberal tradition, given this is the one 
most concerned with the protection of accumulation – of 
private property – from redistribution. We thus encounter 
alienation in the guise of freedom, and it is the deliberate 
confusion between alienation and freedom that forms the 
bedrock of liberalism. Consider the idea of the ‘level playing 
field’. Everyone on the field starts with the same resources, 
the same aptitudes – the playing field is not tilted in such a 
way as to favour any person or group over another. It’s solely 
what they go on to make of themselves that determines the 
outcome of the game. They have the freedom to fail or suc‐
ceed, and the reason they come to have this freedom in the 
first place is that they are alienated from any cau ses for their 
achievement, save individual ones: Homo economicus, the self-
seeking monad. This highly abstract scheme is informative 
(as are many of the schemata of (neo)classical economics) 
through what it excludes – through the elements it illustrates 
by putting them out of frame. 
This mixture between alienation and freedom as charac‐
teristic of liberal ideology is perpetuated by the balance of 
forces in liberal capitalist societies, namely by the state and 
its regulatory-punitive institutions (police and prisons, as 
well as more diffuse, internalised, market-generated agencies 
of incitement, capture and control). In that light, it looks like 
alienation might not be psychological but rather structural. 
Ideology is a er all not about what is hidden, but what neces‐
sarily appears and how, given the kind of society we inhabit. 
The stakes of a materialist analysis are therefore to show how 
the psychological (idealist) and the structural (materialist) 
cannot be held as separate but rather combine in daily expe‐
rience and presuppose one another. This daily experience
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is itself alienated insofar as the structural conditions that
produce it are inaccessible or appear distorted, and certainly 
when they do appear, they do so at a scale and a complexity 
that seems to place them far beyond individual or collective 
intervention. The experience of alienation is itself an alien‐
ated one, because it is one of passive or resigned contempla‐
tion – alienation from the power to do anything about your 
alienation is its primary symptom. 
Nonetheless, ‘alienation’ does have a history of being crit‐
icised in Marxist scholarship as precisely a non-materialist 
concept, as a le over of Marx’s debt to le -Hegelian and 
Feuerbachian humanism. This is because the concept ap‐
pears to presuppose a transhistorical human subject who 
pre-exists a structure and may find itself lost, that is, alien‐
ated within that structure, but may also regain itself, namely 
in revolution or in communism, and hence no longer be 
alienated from its human essence. The ‘not belonging to 
oneself’, the subjugation to ‘alien forces’ shows the proximity 
between the concepts of alienation and of heteronomy 
(domination by external or hostile laws). This is rooted in the 
humanist, post-Enlightenment critique of religion as the dis‐
placement of human agency to imaginary divine powers, 
which keep society subjugated and static in mythic time 
rather than producing active and conscious subjects in his‐
torical time. This is an important point, less for the polemics 
emerging from the work of Louis Althusser and the theory of 
an ‘epistemological break’ between Marx’s humanist-idealist 
and scientific-materialist sides, than for the way it draws our 
attention to the imperative of situating the role of the human 
in this debate. The human is a concept that plays a transitive 
rather than an identificatory or taxonomic role in Marx. For 
example, the concept of the ‘human’ is discussed o en in 
terms of ‘species being’, which in fact functions more as 
‘species becoming’ – the species which is capable of working 
on its own life conditions so as to change them, and change 
itself in the process. But the ‘human’ is a concept which still 
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allows us to open up what is, paradoxically, alienated in the 
formulation of the human in the Western thought and post-
Enlightenment political philosophy drawn upon by Marx; 
that is: how the formulation of the human creates its own 
subhumans, non-humans and ‘aliens’. 
Though the human is a category and a concept replete 
with contradiction and plasticity, it cannot be denied that the 
notion of a human essence, and the corresponding capacity 
to be alienated from it, has restrictions placed upon it by 
technologies of race, gender and coloniality – all of which 
can potentially be elided by ‘humanist’ commitments. For 
the purposes of this essay, the important thing is that alien‐
ation is a certain social relationship – which may take the 
form of a non-relation – to the basic conditions of one’s 
labour and, by extension, the (re)production of one’s life and 
those of others. Defined in those terms, alienation is not a 
‘human condition’ that takes different forms, depending on 
the nature of the government or the standard of living or the 
development of technology in a particular time or place, 
vaguely known as modernity or whatever.
Thus, most of the time when we speak of ‘alienated 
labour’, that is to say, when we are invoking a materialist use 
of ‘alienation’, we speak in a register that mixes the materialist 
and the idealist. To transpose this mixture into yet another 
light: alienation refers to a social ontology of dispossession. It 
is a lack of control and a lack of freedom at the same time; it 
is the constraint (the bedrock of being) of being alive as a hu‐
man – this is the ‘ontology’ part, a theory of what it is to be. 
Alienation is basically about distance, and it is about con‐
straint. Distanced from one’s own desires and constrained to 
follow the desires of others, or constrained to fit into struc‐
tures established by others without your participation, of 
which you are not the prime beneficiary, if you benefit from 
them at all. Alienation means you don’t get to decide on any‐
thing. You are held at a distance from deciding, you are 
blocked, you cannot even begin to know what it might mean 
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to have control over your life as a consistent form of life shared 
with others, rather than as a personal issue. Alienation is not 
constitutive of some abstraction called ‘human nature’, it is 
the bedrock of social relations that take a particular form, the 
form that is dominated by the accumulation of capital and 
the extraction of value, and all the forms of slow and fast vio‐
lence that determine this as either the natural or the socially 
optimal state of affairs.
*
Nevertheless, over the past several years there has been 
movement in some quarters of critical theory to re-appro‐
priate and, as it were, rehabilitate alienation as a concept and 
as a mode – even a politics – of experience. Alienation is 
taken up as a conceptual device to leverage subjectivity out 
of immersion in immediacy, and out of the politics deemed 
to spring from that immersion – horizontality, identity, lo‐
calism, micropolitics, or what accelerationist writers call 
‘folk politics’. In the accelerationist view, rather than an 
ethics of the rooted and the particular – coded as conserva‐
tive, whether le  or right – we ostensibly need a macropoli‐
tics of large-scale social planning, the valorisation of techno-
science and, crucially, the separation of the human from na‐
ture, which allows accelerationism to re-shape nature for its 
own social ends. The lacklustre witticism would be that this 
is ‘species being + robots’, but it’s a bit more complicated – 
maybe. What theoretical formations such as accelera‐
tionism, Prometheanism, ecomodernism and xenofemi‐
nism – and I will provide a few relevant quotes in a second – 
want the concept of alienation to do for them is to help them 
wage a battle against a projected set of antagonists on the 
le , whether in activism or academia, who have decon‐
structed so much of the universe that they have lost all faith 
in the betterment of the human condition; which is to say, 
they have ostensibly given up all political horizons beyond 
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minor acts of sabotage and withdrawal. Hence the accelera‐
tionist’s need for large-scale geo-engineering: in the con‐
ceptual field.
Alienation is brandished as a weapon against the per‐
ceived insularity of this projected le . It is used as a way to 
measure the distance between the potentialities and actuali‐
ties of social existence today and, most of all, the capacity of 
mediating forms like states and parties to co-ordinate partic‐
ular struggles into irresistible large-scale engines of social 
transformation. Alienation is the source of universalism, in 
this perspective, the key to humanity seizing its ontological 
destiny to modify ‘human nature’ and the other-than-human 
(I recently learned Prometheanism is a label shared with en‐
thusiasts of geo-engineering). It’s a bit weird, because there is 
a rejection of immediacy in the quest for collective self-de‐
termination, while the object of political desire for accelera‐
tionists is clearly mediation, that is, an engagement with real‐
ity through its existing institutions and infrastructures, rather 
than a sabotage of or exit from them. And yet it’s alienation – 
which doesn’t seem to have anything to do with self-deter‐
mination, given what I’ve already outlined – that gets mo‐
bilised in this discourse. 
This is just one of a few category errors we can look at in 
many of these accelerationist discourses (see also the pre-
critical or pre-feminist critical use of simple abstractions like 
‘science’ and ‘nature’). The subtitle of the manifesto on 
xenofeminism is ‘A Politics for Alienation’. There we read al‐
most from the very beginning that:
 
XF seizes alienation as an impetus to generate new worlds. We are 
all alienated – but have we ever been otherwise? It is through, and 
not despite, our alienated condition that we can free ourselves 
from the muck of immediacy. Freedom is not a given – and it’s 
certainly not given by anything ‘natural’. The construction of free‐
dom involves not less but more alienation; alienation is the 
labour of freedom’s construction.
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Okay. What comes out here is that alienation is a kind of 
Baron Munchausen-style seizing of oneself by the hair, re‐
moving oneself from one purported essence – the natural – 
and depositing oneself into another essence, alienation, which 
has never been anything other than the human condition. It’s 
not clear what sense of alienation is being upheld here, except 
maybe some vague sociobiological notion, insofar as humans 
are a species not overdetermined by environment and in‐
stinct, which would constitute a genetic alienation. Alienation, 
like value production in a number of similarly hyperbolic dis‐
courses, is everywhere and thus nowhere. 
Even in non-manifesto form, in its more extended theo‐
retical articulations, there appears an odd normativity of 
alienation, used to mean something like ‘mediation’, in the 
service of striking a blow for ambitious social-democratic po‐
litical programmes against retrograde anarchists and other 
radical riffraff who are not sufficiently enthusiastic about a cer‐
tain undifferentiated notion of techno-science. Two more ex‐
amples. One of the xenofeminism manifesto’s authors, Helen 
Hester, wrote an interesting text (‘Promethean Labors and 
Domestic Realism’) about a year ago on the gendering of tech‐
nology and the need to re-articulate social-reproduction fem‐
inism against this. She argues for a ‘feminist Prometheanism’: 
Nascent projects such as xenofeminism, for example, are seeking 
to articulate a technologically minded counter-hegemonic gender 
politics fit for an era of globality, complexity, and alienation, and 
as such, evince a commitment to the development of more sys‐
temic approaches to oppression (reminiscent of those 
Promethean ‘perspectives of winning’ which characterized 
strands of second-wave activism).
Hester encapsulates Prometheanism thus: ‘it might, at its 
most general level, be characterized as a transformative, 
world-building, and technologically enabled emancipatory 
endeavor, oriented towards the future’. Programmes such as 
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Hester’s advocate for more alienation, not less, repurposing it 
as a critical distance, as a willed dis-identification, you could 
say, as an enabler of future-oriented emancipatory endeav‐
ours, even if the cost is being chained to a rock and having a 
vulture nibble at your liver for all eternity. It’s obvious that 
alienation sounds more striking than mediation, but what is 
again at stake here is evidently a politics of mediation, where 
the emphasis is on externalisation (engaging with external 
structures, ‘changing nature’), pitted against a somewhat re‐
ductive notion of the politics of immanence. The alienation 
of alienated labour is nowhere at stake, however. Meanwhile, 
and I’ve had a look, the thinking around Prome theanism that 
Hester critically engages with here doesn’t really deal with 
alienation at all. Nonetheless, alienation seems to be a key as‐
set for xenofeminism, as we’ve already seen.
So what we end up with is a kind of ‘solving’ of alienation, 
which maybe does get at the eradication of at least
the subjective affect of alienation in contemporary labour. 
Xenofeminism and accelerationism, in their use of alien‐
ation, can be viewed as something akin to the critical-theo‐
retical equivalents of the current trend for microdosing psy‐
chedelic drugs in Silicon Valley. Both are ‘solutionist’ 
approaches, that is, they advance a technical fix for a social 
problem, and as such not only misrecognise the problem but 
exacerbate it. It is also solutionist in the sense that we are told 
that more science, or ‘our’ science, can ‘solve’ the patriarchy; 
more alienation, ‘our’ alienation, will solve the alienation of 
capitalist life and its institutions; and microdoses of LSD will 
expand our minds just enough for us to keep moving fast and 
breaking things. In a recent article on the phenomenon 
(‘Ordinary Doses’), Emma Stamm writes that insofar as 
psychedelics are being optimised to deal with mood disor‐
ders, enhance efficiency, and so forth, they are no different to 
anti-depressants, except the whole point of psychedelics is 
that they should create a window, however ephemeral, into 
another way of being in the world, and thus into the trans‐
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formability of it. That was the political horizon claimed for 
psychedelics by the anti-systemic movements of the 1960s – 
the other and more compelling side of their current profile as 
an escapist lifestyle apparatus. Similarly, the solutionist ap‐
proach to alienation is to an extent dictated by market imper‐
atives – the imperative to foist ever-new critical commodities 
into a high-turnover academic market – and this includes the 
imperative to produce relatable alienation, which we can feel 
good about, as well as diagnose in innumerable situations of 
our everyday lives. Alienation thus is no longer a condition of 
distance or passivity; it’s not frustrating, it’s empowering. Its 
logic is no different from the nostrums of ‘self-care’ to which 
it would diametrically oppose itself rhetorically.
This manoeuvre submerges some of the complexities and 
involuntarisms – the structural and structuring dimensions 
of alienation – and also the critical insights that can be recov‐
ered from the project. For Hester, this is the importance of 
reading a gendered history and set of premises into the 
mantra, which has always accompanied capitalist social rela‐
tions and is ever more ubiquitous: that technological innova‐
tion is progress. Given that an entire history of technology 
can be written purely in terms of devices and ways of organ‐
ising production developed by capital to defeat and confine 
the working class (free or bonded), as Marx notes, this reflec‐
tion on technology seems like a crucial extension of social-
reproduction feminist critique. For there is an argument to 
be made – and it o en has been made – that you need alien‐
ation to generate resistance, and that’s why capitalist labour 
and social conditions are emancipatory compared to feudal 
ones. This was, incidentally, also an argument made against 
Wages for Housework: women can only become part of the 
revolutionary class once their labour is officially alienated, by 
wages, outside the home. (This was in many ways exactly like 
the argument made by Wages for Housework, except that for 
them the wage should be paid inside the home as well.) Un‐
packing that is a huge task, requiring a level of historical en‐
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quiry and a turn to dialectics, which Hester’s simple re-val‐
orisation of alienation as a politics adequate to a complex 
world doesn’t really perform. Xenofeminism converts both 
the determinacy and the sociohistorical multivalence of 
alienation into a simple abstraction. And if there’s one point 
to take away from my essay, it’s the difference between the 
crude thought and the simple abstraction. There’s a lot of 
simple abstractions out there and they are hard to avoid, but 
we shouldn’t deliberately be making more of them. Like 
Douglas Huebler said: ‘The world is full of objects, more or less 
interesting; I do not wish to add any more.’
There are at least two ways to make alienation disappear: 
one is to turn it into a positive, even positivist, concept, the 
other is to identify so closely with your alienation that it is 
cancelled out because you are doing what you love. The latter 
is certainly what is o en attributed to artists – I knew I’d get 
back to artistic labour somehow! – and more generally to the 
becoming creative, flexible and auto-entrepreneurialising of 
all work, especially under the sway of social algorithms. In 
my book, Speculation as a Mode of Production (2018), I spend a 
lot of time trying to engage this problematic of alienation. 
There I suggest that the ‘granularity of alienation’ needs to be 
engaged in its profusion and expansion rather than its disap‐
pearance. Insofar as platform capitalism, the gig economy, 
etc., are about the extension of accumulation and commo di‐
fication, as well as the weird resurgence of pre-modern
master–servant relations, packaged in apps, inevitably there 
is alienation of and from labour. This hypothesis of course 
entails a resistance to thinking of alienation chiefly as a psy‐
chological or psychic category. It is a tendency embedded at 
all levels of objectively reproduced social relations. 
Perhaps, in counter to this elision of the psychological, you 
could make the argument that no one is more psychically 
alienated than people who believe – i.e., choose to believe – 
themselves to be performing voluntarily what they are actu‐
ally coerced into doing structurally.
